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1. Introduction 
 
Competition or antitrust regulation across the globe is in constant evolution. This 
evolution is the result of changes in legislation but also importantly of changes in how 
regulatory agencies and courts enforce the legislation. While some changes might reflect 
adjustments in social values, others arise from a greater understanding of how particular 
behaviours can affect competition. As an example, concerns with vertical mergers and 
foreclosure have emerged mostly over the last two decades following advances in our 
understanding of firms' strategic reasons for pursuing vertical integration.   
 
This evolution creates difficulties of its own. In particular, it can introduce uncertainty 
regarding the types of behaviour or transactions that are likely to be scrutinised by the 
competition regulator. This uncertainty has the potential to discourage behaviour that is 
welfare enhancing. This concern has been extensively discussed in the literature2 and 
regulators and policy makers are well aware of it. Indeed, regulators have explicitly 
developed strategies to reduce this uncertainty.  For example, Kovacic (2005), the current 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, suggests that “… a current and 
historically complete enforcement database would promote better understanding and 
analysis, inside and outside the agency, of trends in enforcement activity.”  
 
Information of this type can reduce regulatory uncertainty by promoting a better 
understanding of the regulator’s reasoning. This is the motivation of this paper. This 
paper examines a database that was assembled from a public register of mergers in 
Australia covering 553 decisions from March 2004 to July 2008. The data include the 
outcome of the regulator’s informal merger clearance review (i.e., whether the merger is 
opposed or not) and information such as the industry, the geographic dimension of the 
market (e.g., local versus national) and, importantly, the reasons given for the decision. 
For a subset of the decisions the regulator also publishes a Public Competition 
Assessment. Such assessment is published when a merger is rejected, a merger is subject 
to enforceable undertakings, the merger parties seek such disclosure or a merger is 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bork (1993) 
 3
approved but raises important issues that the regulator considers should be made public.  
Decisions take one of three forms: outright acceptance of the merger proposal; 
acceptance with public scrutiny and publication of a Public Competition Assessment; or 
rejection.  We thus estimate an ordered probit model, where the outcome variable is the 
regulator’s decision, with the objective of developing greater understanding of the 
regulator’s decision-making process. 
 
We should stress that our aim is not to explain or evaluate particular decisions made by 
the regulator3 but rather to improve our understanding of the decision-making process. 
Therefore, we want to investigate what types of reasons (e.g., existence or absence of 
entry barriers or import competition) or industry characteristics might increase the 
likelihood that a merger will be closely scrutinised or rejected. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews a growing literature that aims to 
utilize increasingly available data on merger decisions to develop a better understanding 
of the merger decision process. Section 3 presents our data and empirical strategy. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 
There are several papers that examine merger decisions in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and 
the E.U. with a view to identifying the determinants of competition authorities’ decisions. 
These papers, which are reviewed next, are similar in nature to our approach. 
 
Coate et al. (1990, 1992) provide evidence that political variables, including pressure 
from Congress, influence merger decisions in the U.S. These studies also show that the 
competition authority did not necessarily consider efficiency gains when evaluating 
prospective mergers.  More recently, Coate and Kleit (2004) model the merger review 
                                                 
3 There is a growing interest in the ex-post evaluation of competition decisions or competition policy. See, 
for example, Werden and Froeb (1994) and for a recent discussion Neven (2008).  
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process in which the FTC interacts with the acquiring firm to determine the outcome of 
competition regulation. With respect to firms, the authors find that mergers are driven by 
the opportunity to capture efficiencies.  In contrast, there is no evidence that the 
anticompetitive characteristics of mergers impact firms’ decisions to initiate litigation to 
dispute the FTC’s decision.  Firms, however, are deterred from fighting the FTC by the 
potential negative impact on their reputations.   
 
Weir (1992, 1993) examines proposed mergers in the U.K. between 1974 and 1990 to 
assess the factors that appear to influence the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) when considering mergers. Weir (1992) finds that market shares (whether a 
merger was horizontal or vertical) and the presence of benefits of a merger (such as 
increased employment or exports) do not appear to affect the MMC’s decision to approve 
a merger.  The prospect of increased competition is shown to increase the likelihood of a 
merger being approved whereas the prospect of negative effects on balance of payments 
(i.e., through imports and/or exports) leads to a lesser likelihood that a merger will be 
approved.    
 
Weir (1993) provides a further assessment of the MMC decision process. This is 
achieved by constructing three sub-samples: (i) mergers that increase or decrease 
competition, (ii) mergers with an increase or no change in competition, and (iii) mergers 
with a decrease or no change in competition.  For each sub-sample, Weir investigates a 
range of variables--market share, efficiency gains, effects on the balance of payments, 
prices, research and development, the nature of the merger (horizontal versus vertical), 
the relative profitability of the firms, and choice/quality--and their effect on the MMC's 
decision.  The key result is that mergers were significantly more likely to be approved if 
they increased or had no effect on competition, and expected price impacts were crucial 
in the final assessment.  By and large, other variables were insignificant. 
 
Khemani and Shapiro (1993) investigate proposed mergers in Canada from 1986 to 1989.  
In Canada, there are four possible responses the regulator can give: no issue, monitor, 
restructure or challenge. As in this paper, Khemani and Shapiro use an ordered probit 
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model, though with four outcomes. They find that market share is the strongest 
determinant of whether a merger will be allowed or not, but that other factors, in 
particular import competition and barriers to entry, are relevant (i.e. statistically 
significant).  They find that the extent to which the merger is between vigorous 
competitors or involves one firm that is failing may be relevant to the final decision; 
however collinearity problems in their data prevent them from coming to firm 
conclusions. 
 
Williams et al. (2003) and Bergman et al. (2005) examine the behavior of the European 
Commission in merger decisions based on public information. Williams et al. employ a 
sample of 245 published merger decisions and find that market share is an important 
factor in explaining a negative pronouncement. Bergman et al. construct a sample of 96 
cases and find that the probability that an investigation is initiated is related to barriers to 
entry, post-merger market share and its increase, and a market structure that can lead to 
collusion post-merger.  
 
In contrast, Fernandez et al. (2008) examine a sample of 50 decisions by the European 
Commission’s regulator after the introduction of the 2004 Merger Regulation. They find 
that the probability that a merger is investigated is further impacted by the estimated 
market share increase post-merger, the contestability of the market, and the presence of 
entry barriers.  
 
Finally, Avalis and de Hoyos (2008), using a database of proposed mergers in Mexico 
that they created, split proposals into those that were accepted, those that were accepted 
with conditions and those that were rejected.  For each set, they analyse the 
characteristics associated with the proposal. Their paper focuses on the effects of the 
following characteristics on the decision of the regulator: market concentration, existence 
of efficiency gains, foreign presence, presence of import competition, barriers to entry, 
and whether either of the proposed merger companies owned a company already in the 
market.   
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Avalis and de Hoyos (2008) use both an ordered logit model and a multinomial logit 
model. They show that import competition and barriers to entry are significant factors in 
the decision of whether or not to approve a merger.  However, the authors identify two 
distinct factors that influence the regulator’s decision: (i) foreign-company-related 
mergers are significantly more likely to be accepted; and (ii) efficiency gains make a 
merger more likely to have conditions placed on it rather than being accepted without 
conditions.  Although (ii) might sound counter-intuitive, it is analogous to our result that 
conditions make a public assessment more likely. That is, mergers that are likely to 
involve significant issues but that involve efficiency gains are more likely to be approved 
with conditions than rejected. 
 
There is an important distinction between our approach and the papers reviewed above; 
we rely exclusively on publicly available information. As a result, our data consist mostly 
of qualitative information made publicly available by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC). That is, we do not have quantitative information on 
market shares, number of competitors or the extent of import competition. Nevertheless, 
our analysis provides useful insights into the ACCC’s decision-making process.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy  
 
We examine a database that we assembled from a public register of mergers in Australia 
covering 553 decisions from March 2004 to July 2008. The data include the outcome of 
the ACCC’s informal merger clearance review (i.e., whether the merger is opposed) and 
information such as the industry, the geographic dimension of the market and, 
importantly, the reasons given for the decision. For a subset of the decisions the regulator 
also publishes a Public Competition Assessment. Such an assessment is published when a 
merger is rejected, is subject to enforceable undertakings, the merger parties seek such 
disclosure, or a merger is approved but raises important issues that the regulator considers 
should be made public. The data are available online and have been published monthly 
through the ACCC’s ejournal starting in March 2004.4   
                                                 
4  The ejournal can be accessed at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/392039. 
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The main outcome variable is the decision taken by the ACCC on the merger proposal. 
This variable takes three values as described in Table 1:  No public assessment; Public 
assessment, not opposed; Public assessment, opposed.  As described above, all opposed 
(rejected) merger decisions must be accompanied by a public assessment.  For those not 
opposed, there may or may not be a public assessment, but the presence of a public 
assessment can be clearly interpreted as an indication that the case is qualitatively 
different, and more likely to raise important issues which could result in rejection of the 
application, than those that are accepted without public assessment.  As the outcome is 
discrete and ordered, we assign, arbitrarily, the values 0, 1, and 2 to the three outcomes as 
indicated above. We estimate an ordered probit model controlling for the year and month 
of decision; reason(s) provided for the decision; industry (at the one-digit classification 
level); geographic nature of the market; and the number of firms operating in that 
industry (at the four-digit classification level). 
 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of outcomes for 553 merger decisions 
Result Number 
No public assessment (0) 485 (87.7%) 
Public assessment, not opposed (1) 55 (9.95%) 
Public assessment, opposed (2) 13 (2.35%) 
 
 
Table 2 provides the number of decisions by the geographic nature of the market: 
national; more than one state, but less than national; one state only (but in multiple places 
within the state); and local. Some merger decisions involve multiple markets and so there 
may be more than one market classification for a decision. We also have 33 decisions 
where no data are provided on the geographic nature of the market.  
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Table 2:  Decision outcome by geographic nature of market 
 No public assessment 
Public 
assessment, not 
opposed 
Public 
assessment, 
opposed 
TOTAL 
National 259 34 7 300 
More than one 
state 
36 9 7 47 
One state only 47 4 2 53 
Local 82 7 2 91 
No region 
given 
32 1 0 33 
Multiple 
regions given 
29 0 0 29 
TOTAL 485 55 13 553 
 
The ACCC provides a detailed description of the particular industry (e.g. contact lenses), 
however this description is too detailed for inclusion in a regression model--we would 
end up with nearly one dummy variable for each specific industry/decision.  The ACCC 
does not provide, and we have no way to obtain, information about market shares, 
number of firms in the particular industry or other quantitative information about the 
industry at this level of detail.  Thus, we use information from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics on the number of firms at the four-digit level in the Australian and New 
Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC).  For example, contact lenses would 
fall into the Photographic and Optical Good Manufacturing category. Secondly, we use 
information about the type of industry at the one-digit classification level.  
Table 3:  Decision outcome by total number of firms in the industry at the 4-digit level 
 No public 
assessment 
Public 
assessment, not 
opposed 
Public 
assessment, 
opposed 
TOTAL 
480 or less  113 16 5 134 
More than 480 
but less than or 
equal to 1266  
118 13 5 135 
More than 
1266 but less 
than or equal to 
5862 
125 13 0 138 
More than 
5862 
129 13 4 146 
TOTAL 485 55 13 553 
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics regarding our sample of decisions by industry size, 
as measured by the total number of firms in the relevant four-digit level industry.  Table 4 
provides information about the one-digit level industry breakdown of decisions.  
 
Table 4:  Decision outcome by one-digit industry level  
 
 
No public 
assessment 
Public assessment,  
Not opposed 
Public assessment,  
Opposed 
TOTAL 
A Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
5 0 0 5 
B Mining 16 2 0 18 
C Manufacturing 115 12 5 132 
D Electricity, Gas, Water 
and Waste Services 
56 7 2 65 
E Construction 3 0 0 3 
F Wholesale Trade 18 2 0 20 
G Retail Trade 40 3 2 45 
H Accommodation and Food 
Services 
2 0 0 2 
I Transport, Postal and 
Warehousing 
37 10 1 48 
J Information Media and 
Telecommunications 
54 6 0 60 
K Financial and Insurance 
Services 
39 1 0 40 
L Rental, Hiring and Real 
Estate Services 
10 2 0 12 
M Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Services 
10 1 1 12 
N Administrative and 
Support Services 
3 0 0 3 
O Public Administration and 
Safety 
1 0 0 1 
P Education and Training 0 0 0 0 
Q Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
27 7 0 34 
R Arts and Recreation 
Services 
3 1 1 5 
S Other Services 4 0 0 4 
 Multiple industries listed 42 1 1 44 
 Total 485 55 13 553 
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Table 5:  Decision outcome by category of stated reason 
Reasons are not mutually exclusive 
 
No public 
assessment 
Public 
assessment, 
Not opposed 
Public 
assessment,  
Opposed 
TOTAL 
1. market power 
No change in market structure / share or 
failure to cross ACCC thresholds / increase 
in competition/significant market power 
192 23 3 218 
2. competition 
Existence (potential for) substantial 
competitors/ lessening of competition 
315 27 11 353 
3. import market 
Existence (potential for) significant import 
market/ insignificant import market 
60 5 5 70 
4. market share 
 Insignificant / significant change in 
Australian market share  
32 5 3 40 
5. barriers to entry 
Low barriers to entry / significant barriers 
to entry 
106 10 11 127 
 
6. substitutes 
Significant substitutes / Insignificant 
substitutes or complementary products 
28 3 3 34 
7. vertical market power  
Lack of vertical market power 
69 8 5 82 
8. Existence of an undertaking 
The provision of a contract addressing 
ACCC concerns/ a court enforceable 
undertaking 
20 18 0 38 
No reason provided 33 1 0 34 
Total 485 55 13 553 
Note:  Column totals do not add up because the regulator gives more than one reason for most decisions. 
 
Table 5 provides information about the reason provided by the regulator in making its 
decision.  Note that a reason may be given as evidence in support of a merger or in 
opposition to a merger.  For example, the regulator may state that given the lack of any 
entry barriers, the merger need not be opposed.  Conversely, the regulator may oppose a 
merger on the basis of significant entry barriers.5  We create 8 decision indicator 
variables to capture the type of issue(s) that the regulator mentioned in making the 
decision.  Table 5 summarizes the reasons provided by the regulator either in favor of or 
                                                 
5 We do not separate 'positive' and 'negative' references to each possible issue, since in our regression 
analysis we will be looking at the relationship between an issue being mentioned and the decision outcome.  
Obviously a lack of barriers will be correlated with merger approvals and presence of barriers with 
rejections.  Including these as two separate categories in our regression introduces serious endogeneity 
problems into the model. 
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against the merger.  Note that most decisions have more than one stated reason but 34 
decisions have no reason provided by the regulator.   The eight categories are: “market 
power”, “competition”, “import market”, “market share”, “barriers to entry”, 
“substitutes”, “vertical market power” , and “existence of an undertaking” (8).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 6 provides the results from an ordered probit model of the regulator's decision (0, 1 
or 2 as detailed above).  The values in the table are the marginal effects.  We only provide 
marginal effects for outcomes 1 and 2. The marginal effects on all three outcomes must 
sum to zero, so the marginal effects for outcome 0 are the additive inverse of the sum of 
the marginal effects for outcomes 1 and 2. The values in parentheses are the t-statistics 
from the test of significance of the marginal effect. Stars indicate significance at the one 
(∗∗∗), five (∗∗), and ten (∗) percent levels. In a few cases, the coefficient in the model is 
statistically different than zero but the marginal effect is only just insignificant. These are 
indicated with 
† 
and 
†† 
for ten and five per cent significance, respectively.6 For dummy 
variables, marginal effects are calculated using the discrete change from 0 to 1, not as a 
calculus approximation.  
 
We include dummy variables in the model for month and year of decision.  
December/January is the omitted month category--decisions for these two months are 
grouped without distinction in the regulator's reports--and 2004 is the omitted year.  
There do appear to be some minor seasonal effects--decisions are more likely to be 
publicly assessed/opposed in March and less likely to be so in May relative to 
December/January.  Decisions were more likely to be publicly assessed/opposed in 2005 
and 2007 relative to 2004.  We have no compelling explanation for these results. 
 
                                                 
6 Marginal effects are generated in STATA following Greene (2003)--see page 738.  The standard errors of 
the marginal effects depend upon the point at which they are calculated and thus the significance of the 
marginal effects may differ from the significance of the coefficients.  Marginal effects are calculated at the 
mean values of the data. 
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We include dummy variables for industry at the 1-digit level with Manufacturing, the 
largest industry, as the omitted category (see Table 4).  There are 8 industries for which 
we have less than 10 observations. We use one dummy variable for this group of 
industries as we cannot identify any effects with so few observations.   
 
We attempt to capture the geographic size of the market through a set of dummy 
variables based upon the categories of Table 2.  We include a separate dummy for the 33 
observations which have no geographical information available.  The omitted category in 
the regression is national, so the coefficients on the other market/region coefficients need 
to be interpreted relative to the market being a national one.  
     
We considered two separate specifications for industry size.  In one, we use the number 
of firms in the industry as a continuous variable. This variable was insignificant in all 
models.  In the other, we control for the number of firms with a set of four dummy 
variables based upon Table 3. We label these, “small”, “medium”, “large” and “very 
large.”  We omit “large” in the regression results presented below so coefficients on the 
other variables relating to the number of firms need to be interpreted relative to “large”.  
These categorical variables were also all jointly insignificant.7  We only report the latter 
specification.  Whether we use the continuous measure or the dummy variable approach 
for industry size has no impact on the other variables.  
 
[TABLE 6 about here] 
 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 present the full model controlling for all the factors discussed 
above. The industry dummies are jointly insignificant (p-value of 0.87), the dummies for 
number of firms in the industry are jointly insignificant (p-value of 0.72) and the market 
region variables are jointly insignificant (p-value of 0.50). If we test for joint significance 
of those three variable sets we fail to reject that they are all jointly equal to zero (p-value 
of 0.85).  
                                                 
7 We do not find this lack of significance surprising as our measure of industry size is poorly matched to 
the specific industry which was considered in the decision, as described in section 3. 
 13
 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 present a restricted model with most of the variables for 
industry, number of firms in the industry, and market region set to zero. We keep the 
variable for “Wholesale Trade” since this variable is just significant at the 10 per cent 
level in the unrestricted model.   Whether we look at the full model of columns 2 and 3 or 
the restricted model of columns 4 and 5, we come to the same conclusions regarding the 
key variables which are those relating to the decision reason of the regulator. 
 
In interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind that this model is a reduced 
form model of the correlations between the variables considered and the decision 
outcome of the regulator.  The analysis is exploratory and the coefficient estimates can 
not be viewed as ‘causal’ parameters.  Nonetheless, we believe that this exercise 
enhances our understanding of the regulator’s decision-making process.   
  
Importantly, there are three reasons that stand out as important in relation to the ACCC’s 
decision to closely scrutinise a merger proposal: the existence of entry barriers, concerns 
about market concentration and the existence of undertakings.  In particular, a merger is 
approximately 14% more likely to be subject to a public assessment when entry barriers 
are included as reasons.8  To be clear, if we compare two decisions, one which does not 
mention entry barriers (either in a positive or a negative way) with a decision that does 
mention entry barriers (either in a positive or negative way), then the latter is about 14% 
more likely to be subject to a public assessment than the former.  
 
The provision of undertakings or court-enforceable contracts by the merging parties 
leads, for obvious reasons, to a likelihood of around 40% that the merger will be subject 
to a public assessment. In terms of the industry dummies, mergers that occur in the 
wholesale trade market seem to result in a lower likelihood, around 6% lower, that a 
public assessment exercise will be undertaken.  
                                                 
8 The sum of the two marginal effects is 14 per cent.  Holding all other things constant, if entry barriers are 
mentioned by the regulator in the decision, that it is 14 per cent more likely to be publicly assessed with no 
opposition or opposed (with public assessment) and 14 per cent less likely to be not opposed without public 
assessment.  
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In Table 7, we present the estimates of a probit model of the probability of a project being 
publicly assessed.  This model groups categories 1 and 2 from the ordered probit model 
of Table 6 into one category.  We find very similar results to the ordered probit model. 
Columns 2 and 3 present the marginal effects (on the probability of a project being 
publicly assessed). In the model with all control variables, the industry dummies are 
jointly insignificant (p-value of 0.85), the dummies for number of firms in the industry 
are jointly insignificant (p-value of 0.60) and the market region variables are jointly 
insignificant (p-value of 0.40). If we test for joint significance of those three variable sets 
we fail to reject that they are all jointly equal to zero (p-value of 0.83). Column 3 of 
Table 7 presents the results from a restricted model with these variables (mostly) set 
equal to zero.  Again, we leave “Wholesale Trade” in the model since this variable is 
nearly significant in the full model. It is significantly different than zero in the restricted 
model. The results once more highlight that entry barriers, market share and undertakings 
are important reasons behind the ACCC’s decision to undertake a public assessment 
exercise. 
[TABLE 7 about here] 
 
We also estimated models of the probability of rejection for the 68 publicly assessed 
decisions.  One consequence of the small number of decisions which are publicly 
assessed is that there is no variation for some variables so we cannot consider the effect 
of 'presence of an undertaking', for example.  If we estimate a model using those 
variables for which there is variation, we find that none of the industry dummies nor the 
industry size variables are significant.  We find that two of the decision reason variables–
‘import market’ and ‘entry barriers’–are significant.  When entry decisions are mentioned 
in conjunction with a decision, that decision is 46% more likely to be opposed than a 
decision that does not mention entry barriers.  Decisions that specifically refer to import 
competition are 34% more likely to be opposed than those that don't. 9  The results 
confirm the importance and direction of these two effects found in our preferred ordered 
models of Tables 6 and 7. 
                                                 
9 Detailed estimation results are available from the authors. 
 15
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The results above present a prima facie case that the ACCC’s merger decision process is 
by and large focused in the right direction. That is, decisions that mention entry barriers 
are more likely to be closely scrutinised than those that do not. Moreover, entry barriers 
and import competition are important determinants of a decision to oppose a merger. 
Nothing else seems to influence, in a consistent way, the likelihood that a merger will 
either be closely scrutinised or opposed by the regulator. 
 
We have to be careful, however, on how far we take our results. There is clearly the 
potential for a reverse causality problem.  Namely, the regulator might have referred to 
entry barriers (or import competition) as a reason for further investigation or opposition 
to a merger not entirely exclusively because of the underlying economics, but rather 
because it is the expected outcome.   
 
Moreover, our findings cannot be interpreted as suggesting that the ACCC has made the 
correct decisions by investigating or approving or rejecting a particular merger. Such 
evaluation would necessarily involve a case-by-case analysis that might rely on the 
information available to the regulator at the time of the decision; in this study we only use 
publicly available information. Nevertheless, this type of study may provide useful 
guidance for companies considering a merger by helping them to understand the ACCC’s 
decision process.  
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Table 6: Estimates from ordered probit model
Table entries are marginal effects
Public Assessment Public Assessment
no
opposition
opposition
no
opposition
opposition
Variables relating to decision reason
Market Power 0.031
(1.27)
0.0053
(1.14)
0.030
(1.28)
0.0061
(1.16)
Competition 0.017
(0.71)
0.0027
(0.71)
0.012
(0.56)
0.0024
(0.56)
Import Market 0.039
(0.92)
0.0071
(0.80)
0.048
(1.24)
0.0111
(1.05)
Market Share 0.097
(1.76)
∗†† 0.0222
(1.27)
†† 0.084
(1.69)
∗†† 0.0225
(1.27)
††
Entry Barriers 0.114
(2.99)
∗∗∗††† 0.0252
(2.04)
∗∗††† 0.111
(3.18)
∗∗∗††† 0.030
(2.23)
∗∗†††
Substitutes 0.037
(0.72)
0.007
(0.62)
0.035
(0.76)
0.0080
(0.66)
Vertical Market Power 0.031
(0.90)
0.0056
(0.80)
0.023
(0.73)
0.0049
(0.67)
Existence of an undertaking 0.262
(4.45)
∗∗∗††† 0.1152
(2.12)
∗∗††† 0.263
(5.31)
∗∗∗††† 0.147
(2.58)
∗∗∗†††
Month indicator dummies
February 0.012
(0.22)
0.0020
(0.21)
0.0001
(0.00)
0.00003
(0.00)
March 0.101
(1.63)
†† 0.0233
(1.18)
†† 0.100
(1.77)
∗†† 0.028
(1.29)
††
April 0.020
(0.37)
0.0036
(0.34)
0.019
(0.37)
0.004
(0.35)
May −0.058
(2.17)
∗∗ −0.0076
(2.00)
∗∗ −0.058
(2.21)
∗∗ −0.0092
(2.13)
∗∗
June −0.034
(0.91)
−0.0048
(0.72)
−0.021
(0.51)
−0.0037
(0.55)
July −0.041
(1.20)
−0.0056
(0.72)
−0.049
(1.69)
∗ −0.0081
(1.74)
∗
August −0.013
(0.36)
−0.0020
(0.72)
−0.0098
(0.28)
−0.0019
(0.29)
September 0.027
(0.49)
0.0048
(0.72)
0.020
(0.40)
0.0043
(0.37)
October 0.011
(0.23)
0.0018
(0.22)
0.015
(0.33)
0.0032
(0.31)
November −0.023
(0.65)
−0.0035
(0.69)
−0.023
(0.67)
−0.0042
(0.71)
Year indicator dummies
2005 0.082
(1.46)
† 0.017
(1.11)
† 0.089
(1.62)
† 0.023
(1.22)
†
2006 0.041
(0.85)
0.0074
(0.75)
0.032
(0.73)
0.0069
(0.66)
2007 0.078
(1.53)
† 0.015
(1.20)
† 0.065
(1.39)
0.015
(1.15)
2008 0.016
(0.22)
0.0027
(0.21)
0.031
(0.51)
0.0068
(0.46)
Entries in table are marginal effects (their t-statistics are in parentheses).
†††, †† and † indicate that the coefficient is significant at the one, five, and ten per cent levels,
respectively.
Stars indicate significance of the marginal effects at the one (∗∗∗), five (∗∗), and ten (∗) percent
levels.
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Table 6 (continued): Estimates from ordered probit model
Table entries are marginal effects
Public Assessment Public Assessment
no
opposition
opposition
no
opposition
opposition
Industry variables
Mining −0.020
(0.40)
−0.0030
(0.44)
Electricity, Gas, Water and
Waste Services
0.030
(0.66)
0.0055
(0.59)
Wholesale Trade −0.051
(1.92)
∗ −0.0068
(1.84)
∗ −0.057
(2.57)
∗∗∗† −0.0092
(2.28)
∗∗†
Retail Trade 0.007
(0.14)
0.0011
(0.14)
Transport, Postal and
Warehousing
0.046
(0.87)
0.0087
(0.74)
Information Media and
Telecommunications
−0.008
(0.23)
−0.0013
(0.23)
Financial and Insurance
Services
−0.042
(1.23)
−0.0057
(1.35)
Rental, Hiring and Real Es-
tate Services
−0.014
(0.22)
−0.0022
(0.24)
Professional, Scientific and
Technical Services
0.030
(0.34)
0.0054
(0.30)
Health Care and Social As-
sistance
0.032
(0.60)
0.0059
(0.53)
Less than 10 industry ob-
servations
−0.017
(0.38)
−0.0026
(0.40)
Geographical nature of market
More than one state 0.025
(0.62)
0.0044
(0.56)
State −0.021
(0.74)
−0.0032
(0.77)
Local −0.038
(1.51)
−0.0056
(1.46)
No region provided 0.024
(0.24)
0.0042
(0.22)
Number of firms in the industry
Small 0.030
(0.71)
0.0054
(0.63)
Medium 0.0012
(0.04)
0.0002
(0.04)
Very Large −0.016
(0.56)
−0.0025
(0.56)
Entries in table are marginal effects (their t-statistics are in parentheses).
†††, †† and † indicate that the coefficient is significant at the one, five, and ten per cent levels,
respectively.
Stars indicate significance at the one (∗∗∗), five (∗∗), and ten (∗) percent levels.
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Table 7: Estimates from probit model
Dependent variable: project is publicly assessed
Table entries are marginal effects
Public
Assessment
Public
Assessment
Variables relating to decision reason
Market Power 0.032
(1.13)
0.032
(1.17)
Competition 0.010
(0.36)
0.005
(0.17)
Import Market 0.033
(0.73)
0.043
(1.03)
Market Share 0.093
(1.71)
∗ 0.085
(1.64)
∗
Entry Barriers 0.107
(2.78)
∗∗∗ 0.108
(2.92)
∗∗∗
Substitutes 0.037
(0.65)
0.038
(0.71)
Vertical Market Power 0.038
(0.96)
0.031
(0.82)
Existence of an undertaking 0.448
(5.25)
∗∗∗ 0.48
(6.05)
∗∗∗
Month indicator dummies
February 0.015
(0.25)
0.001
(0.02)
March 0.122
(1.89)
∗ 0.124
(2.02)
∗∗
April 0.022
(0.37)
0.023
(0.39)
May −0.065
(1.45)
−0.065
(1.43)
June −0.043
(0.84)
−0.028
(0.57)
July −0.058
(1.25)
−0.066
(1.50)
August −0.022
(0.52)
−0.022
(0.51)
September 0.014
(0.25)
0.009
(0.16)
October −0.012
(0.24)
−0.003
(0.06)
November −0.041
(0.94)
−0.040
(0.94)
Year indicator dummies
2005 0.155
(2.23)
∗∗ 0.174
(2.48)
∗∗
2006 0.086
(1.42)
0.077
(1.33)
2007 0.132
(2.12)
∗∗ 0.121
(2.02)
∗∗
2008 0.033
(0.39)
0.052
(0.70)
Entries in table are marginal effects (their t-statistics are in parentheses).
Stars indicate significance of the marginal effects (and coefficients) at the one (∗∗∗), five (∗∗),
and ten (∗) percent levels.
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Table 7 (continued): Estimates from probit model
Dependent variable: project is publicly assessed
Table entries are marginal effects
Public
Assessment
Public
Assessment
Industry variables
Mining −0.009
(0.13)
Electricity, Gas, Water and
Waste Services
0.046
(0.87)
Wholesale Trade −0.054
(1.31)
−0.064
(1.72)
∗
Retail Trade 0.017
(0.31)
Transport, Postal and
Warehousing
0.072
(1.21)
Information Media and
Telecommunications
0.006
(0.13)
Financial and Insurance
Services
−0.043
(0.84)
Rental, Hiring and Real Es-
tate Services
0.007
(0.08)
Professional, Scientific and
Technical Services
0.037
(0.38)
Health Care and Social As-
sistance
0.062
(0.97)
Less than 10 industry ob-
servations
−0.027
(0.46)
Geographical nature of market
More than one state 0.022
(0.49)
State −0.034
(0.99)
Local −0.050
(1.56)
No region provided 0.018
(0.18)
Number of firms in the industry
Small 0.034
(0.73)
Medium −0.014
(0.38)
Very Large −0.026
(0.75)
Entries in table are marginal effects (their t-statistics are in parentheses).
Stars indicate significance of the marginal effects (and coefficients) at the one (∗∗∗), five (∗∗),
and ten (∗) percent levels.
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